University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review
2021

Authority and Meaning
Laurence Claus

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Claus, Laurence, "Authority and Meaning" (2021). Connecticut Law Review. 481.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/481

School of Law

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 52

APRIL 2021

NUMBER 5

Essay
Authority and Meaning
LAURENCE CLAUS
This conference contribution celebrates Richard Kay’s contention that a
sound theory of legal meaning depends on a sound theory of legal status. Contrary
to Kay, I conclude that identifying law’s true source reveals that we should seek
law’s meaning not primarily in lawgivers’ intentions, but in public understanding.
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Authority and Meaning
LAURENCE CLAUS *
INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, Richard Kay reminded us that where we look for words’
meaning should depend on why we are paying attention to them.
Identifying the meaning of a constitution, he contended, cannot be
disconnected from the source of its status as law. This contribution to the
celebration praises Kay’s insight that a sound theory of legal meaning
depends on a sound theory of legal status. While acclaiming that
conclusion, we will examine Kay’s account of what makes the United
States Constitution our law and notice how adjusting our vision of the
Constitution’s legal status alters our approach to identifying the
Constitution’s meaning.
I. KAY’S VISION OF AUTHORITY AND MEANING
For Kay, “[t]he central problem with the original public meaning view
of constitutional interpretation is that it severs the connection between the
Constitution’s rules and the authority that makes us care about those rules
in the first place.”1 Kay argues that “[t]he normative force of any legal rule
is, first and foremost, the consequence of regard for the lawmaker,”2 and
that “[n]o constitution—no posited norm of any kind—can succeed if it is
not regarded as the authentic command of a legitimate lawmaker.”3
Whence comes the legal status of the United States Constitution? Kay
locates it in the decisions of state ratifying conventions that were
understood by the founding generation to reflect “the will of ‘the people.’”4
Whether or not characterizing those decisions in that way is plausible,
“[t]he critical point,” according to Kay, is “that the United States
Constitution, like any other piece of legislation, derives its force from
regard for the circumstances of its enactment.”5 Kay concludes that

*

Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 703, 714 (2009).
2
Id. at 715.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 716.
5
Id. at 717.
1
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“recourse to the original intentions provides a link that is essential to the
legitimacy of constitutional judicial review.”6
II. THE NATURE OF LAW
Let us look a little closer at the conceptual building blocks of Kay’s
argument for treating the quest for legal meaning as a quest for lawmaker
intent. Among these elements, we can see authority, legitimacy, normative
force, and success. Do these elements each describe something we have
real reasons to care about, and if so, do they describe different things or are
they really just alternative ways of saying the same thing? Let’s start with
success. We clearly have to care about that. What makes a constitution
successful? As we are considering success en route to a theory of
constitutional meaning, it would be question begging to treat conformity to
the results of applying a particular theory of constitutional meaning as our
criterion of success. But we can surely say that inducing conformity in
some rational sense is what success at being a constitution—indeed success
at being any sort of law—involves.
What causes conformity to law? Many things might in various
circumstances—well-made law will often track what we would have, or
could acquire, moral reasons to do or not do anyway. But what is the
common denominator reason that we can confidently call conformity to
law because it is law? In search of that, we could peel back the legal layers
to reach the core of a legal system, what H. L. A. Hart called its “rule of
recognition.”7 What makes that successful? Hart ultimately concluded that
the rule of recognition is a convention—that its reality as a progenitor of
law in a community depends on a shared understanding and expectation
among strategically situated members of that community, those Hart called
“officials.”8 Officials, including official dispute resolvers, owe their legal
status to their general conformity to a shared understanding and
expectation about what counts as law and who count as lawgivers. Their
understanding is accurate, their expectation is reasonable, because that
understanding and expectation are shared. Each actor looks from side to
side at what others are likely to do and to expect. As in the formation of all

6

Id. at 704.
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 6 (2d ed. 1994).
8
Id. at 116–17. “Rules are conventional social practices if the general conformity of a group to
them is part of the reasons which its individual members have for acceptance. . . . [C]onventional social
rules . . . include, besides ordinary social customs (which may or may not be recognized as having legal
force), certain important legal rules including the rule of recognition, which is in effect a form of
judicial customary rule existing only if it is accepted and practised in the law-identifying and
law-applying operations of the courts.” Id. at 255–56.
7
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social customs, the understanding and expectations so formed are
self-vindicating and self-fulfilling.9
If the core of a legal system emerges through shared expectations, if its
essence is social custom, then doesn’t the whole legal system grow forth
from shared expectations, from social custom? Our following particular
persons pedigreed by that system as lawgivers, including constitutional
lawgivers, would then be not a departure from custom, but an extension of
custom, morally supported by whatever morally supports following
custom. Customs of following leaders would just be custom-based fast
tracks to many more customs. Our underlying reason for following law
“because it is law” would be the thing that makes it law, namely its success
at self-fulfillingly expressing what people in our community are likely to
do and to expect, including how various among them are likely to respond
to how we act—for example, by expressing disapproval of nonconformity
or even punishing us for it. That weighty (though not preemptive) and
law-specific reason for following law would be not only about eliciting
approval and avoiding punishment, but more deeply about our need to have
the shared expectations that law alone can provide. The shared
expectations that law gives us are the only way we can live together in
large groups, with people with whom we have no personal intimacy. Those
expectations depend on a feedback loop to and from our general
conformity to them. Law’s ongoing reality in our lives depends on our
general conformity to it, without which its constitutive expectations
evaporate. Our realizing and acting on that understanding of our
circumstances, our choice to live in a way that enhances our prospects of
maintaining the system that lets us live together well, distinguishes our
disposition from that which might appear in crude caricatures of legal
realism. Legal systems are multifaceted prediction systems that we have
strong moral reason to preserve, because we live inside them. Hart rightly
rejected the notion that statements of obligation are just predictions,10 but a
prediction system can produce moral obligation if there is good in having
that system. And the general conformity that enables our shared
expectations depends upon shared understanding of what the law is.
Without a way to identify and share legal meaning, we would, as Jürgen
Habermas observes, have to give up on “the very function of law, to
stabilize expectations.”11
9
Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 99, 121 (Jules Coleman
ed., 2001) (“They are, in a sense, officials in virtue of that rule, but they are not officials prior to it (in
either the factual or the logical sense). Their behaviour makes the rule possible; but it is the rule that
makes them officials.”). See also Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 191–
92 (1981) (considering Hart’s descriptive account of the rule of recognition).
10
HART, supra note 7, at 84.
11
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
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III. CONSTITUTIONALISM
Let us return to Kay’s bottom line, “that the United States Constitution,
like any other piece of legislation, derives its force from regard for the
circumstances of its enactment.”12 What is the distinctively legal nature of
that regard? What perception of the acts of the ratifying conventions
turned the Philadelphia document into the law of the land? Kay notes a
range of rationales that might potentially be cited within a group to explain
that group’s regard for the circumstances that generated its law:
Those circumstances may be compelling because they
embody what is thought to be the will of the people. Or they
may be thought to incorporate special safeguards that filter
out unsound decisions. Or they may be perceived as eliciting
the judgments of the wisest members of society or the
holiest.13
In such a miscellany of potential rationales we might detect a scent of
rationalization. The world abounds with failed constitutions for which such
nice things could similarly be said. However much people may have paid
lip service to, and even believed in, approbations of these kinds, their
applicability, real or apparent, cannot in itself explain what makes the
difference between success and failure at becoming and staying law. Only
one explanation supplies a universally necessary and sufficient criterion for
becoming and staying law, and that is the explanation of Hart’s rule of
recognition. Constitutions become real, words become law, when enough
people in a community expect that enough other people in that community
will treat them as law, that is, will treat them as expressing what people in
the group are likely to do and to expect. Words become law when they
succeed self-fulfillingly in expressing what is custom for us. And that turns
completely on how we understand and expect most others in our group to
be regarding those words. That is the crucial regard achieved by the
circumstances of the United States Constitution’s enactment. Not that the
process of adoption was really or apparently the most morally worthy
one—its revolutionary departure from the amendment rules of the existing
system was vociferously condemned by opponents14—but that those
LAW AND DEMOCRACY 201 (William Rehg trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1996) (1992) (“A flat
revocation of any guarantees of legal certainty leads to the conclusion that the legal system must
ultimately give up the idea of satisfying the very function of law, to stabilize expectations. The realists
cannot explain how the functionally necessary accomplishments of the legal system are compatible
with a radical skepticism on the part of legal experts.”).
12
Kay, supra note 1, at 717.
13
Id. (internal citation omitted).
14
See, e.g., 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 189 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (Luther Martin’s, “Genuine Information,” which he delivered to the
Maryland legislature on November 29, 1787: “The same reasons which you now urge for destroying
OF
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circumstances of enactment made it what most everyone was thereafter
likely to treat as the thing. Initially fragile expectations about the
Constitution’s status strengthened as, month by month, people continued to
act as if it was going to be the thing by doing the acts that it contemplated:
holding elections, convening, governing. We could call that emerging
regard . . . the internal point of view.15
Kay contends that “[t]his cannot be the whole story. There is always a
reason why an attempted assertion of power is effective.”16 In particular, he
concludes that “[i]n the case of a constitution, it will be essential that there
exists an explicit or implicit determination by some significant part of the
population that the makers of the constitution are or were an appropriate
source of constitutional rules.”17
In evaluating whether others are likely to follow, we have reason to ask
whether what is being held out, and the way it is being held out, make it
something others are likely to follow. Relevant to that enquiry are whether
the content looks like a recipe for good government and whether those who
came up with it received the opportunity to do so in a good way. But those
things are relevant to whether purported law becomes and stays law only to
the extent they help inform people’s understanding of what others are
likely to do and to expect. Members of a community might undertake a
morally impeccable process of consultative and representative constitution
writing. That community might engage in an act of indisputably
democratic adoption of a text that exudes virtue in applying our best
understandings of what will maximize the odds of good governance. None
of that will be reason enough for us to follow, if we do not think that others
are likely to do so too. In deciding whether to follow purported law, we
have no reason to step out and try to make the sound of one hand clapping.
Being seen as “an appropriate source of constitutional rules”18 is not
sufficient to turn that source’s words into law. But is it necessary?
No. We have strong reason to follow a lot of purported law that comes
from bad leaders who came into leadership in bad ways if that is what most
others in our community are likely to do and to expect. Bad governance is
of course more likely to trigger a moment of revolutionary transition. But
those moments arise infrequently and unpredictably precisely because they
depend on concerted mass action without the coordinative guidance of the
our present federal government, may be urged for abolishing the system, which you now propose to
adopt; and as the method prescribed by the Articles of Confederation is now totally disregarded by you,
as little regard may be shown by you to the rules prescribed for the amendment of the new system”).
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII (declaring unanimous consent of the states
necessary for amending the Articles).
15
Cf. HART, supra note 7, at 88–91.
16
Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 721 (2011).
17
Id.
18
Id.
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existing legal system and usually subject to that system’s coordinated
moves to suppress. In the meantime, we have reason to recognize that our
existing sub-optimal law and government are real. Most decent human
beings in most mass societies throughout human history have lived their
whole lives in conformity to law and government that were not
“appropriate” sources of guidance if “appropriate” implies more moral
support than that which comes from being customary. Most human mass
societies have spent most of their history under the thumbs of successive
strongmen who were mediocre or worse. They did so, as David Hume
observed in his famous demolition of social contract theories, because
“they were born to such an obedience.”19 They went with the best path of
life that they could see, drawing value from the way law lets us live
together even when our leaders are bad. Their choice to conform did not
depend on their being convinced of their leaders’ appropriateness. Having
a virtuous and credible backstory is neither necessary nor sufficient for a
legal system and government. Good stories, whether credible or incredible,
may help motivate conformity, but mainly by cluing us into what others
are likely to do and to expect, as we hear them retelling those stories.
Hart’s contrast between law and the demands of a bank-robbing
gunman is sharpened by the ad hoc, arbitrary character of such a gunman’s
actions.20 Law’s distinctive contribution to our lives is to make our
relations with one another less ad hoc, more predictable, and so let us live
together in large groups. But there is no necessary contrast at all between
the morality of individual governing actions and the morality of bank
robbing. Often enough, so-called “authoritarian” leaders are gunmen;
criminal gangs do run whole nations. Nonetheless, those nations have law;
those gangs are government. That understanding is part and parcel of legal
positivism—what’s legal isn’t necessarily what’s moral.
What makes people leaders is the fact of following. What makes their
words law is their actual success in expressing what people in their
community are likely to do and to expect. Of course we would rather have
good leaders than bad ones, but good or bad, people are lawgivers if their
community in fact treats their words as law. Whether lawgivers came to
power in good ways or bad, and whether their acts of purported lawgiving
are morally justified or not, their words are law for us if and only if enough
people in our community understand and expect them to be law. Our
ever-present reason to care about law is not that we owe something to
lawgivers, but that we need law’s help to live together. We read law not to
understand lawgivers. We read law to understand one another, to learn how
19
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 548 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press
1888) (1740) (for reference in other editions of this work, this citation may be found in book III, part II,
section VIII).
20
HART, supra note 7, at 19–25, 82–85, 281.
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life is likely to be in our community. And that fact tells us where to look
for law’s meaning.
The understanding we need when we read law is not what lawgivers
intended, but what our community understands its law to be. We do not
need our lawgivers even to intend to be lawgivers. They could be as
reluctant to fulfill the role as the hapless protagonist in Monty Python’s
Life of Brian or as insensible to our circumstances as was the Emperor
Justinian to the European communities that, centuries later, latched onto
the Corpus Juris Civilis.21 What we need is a vehicle for shared
understanding across our community and over time about how our life
together is going to be. And for that, we need law to have a public
meaning.
IV. AUTHORITY, LEGITIMACY, AND NORMATIVE FORCE
Our deployment of the words authority and legitimacy often slides,
sometimes even within a sentence, between use as a synonym for what is
truly law and government and use to describe the source of what is truly
law and government. Synonymous uses will always be with us, but do not
really add to arguments about what morally justifies trying to make or
follow law. If we are saying that an act of purported governing is outside
authority or illegitimate in the synonymous sense of not in conformity with
existing law, then we are not really adding to calling it illegal. The moral
merits of that illegal act turn on whether, all things considered, it is morally
justified—whether moral reasons for that actor in that situation to conform
to existing law were outweighed by moral reasons to do differently.
Behind an intentionalist intuition about legal meaning may lie a
different usage of authority and legitimacy, the one for which the words
first appeared, namely, a reference to the true source of law and
government. The words authority and legitimacy come from a framework
for thinking about law and lawgiving that is wholly incompatible with a
conventionalist account. The old account conceived of law and government
as real if and only if they came from persons who had moral rights to rule,
moral rights to be followed. It denied the descriptions “law” and
“government” to power dynamics unsupported by such moral rights. The
old account saw those moral rights as preemptive—the source of the one
true answer to who was lawgiver and who was not, as morally compelling
of obedience and as exclusionary of reasons for doing differently as the
divine command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.22 And, of course, if what
21
See generally MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (HandMade Films & Python (Monty) Pictures
1979); EMPEROR JUSTINIAN I, CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS (565 CE).
22
Genesis 22. See LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING ch. 3
(2012).
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made words law was the moral right of their issuer to be obeyed, then the
search for their meaning could naturally be understood as a search for the
issuer’s intention. Alleging such moral rights to rule made sense only
because of their purported pedigree, as direct delegations of property rights
over humans from the creator or creators of humans. When the
Enlightenment debunked divine right accounts of law and government, it
left us still saddled with some of the linguistic and conceptual baggage of
the discredited old idea, yet no one then or since has come up with a
satisfactory substitute source of preemptive rights to rule.23 Social contract
notoriously does not fill the void, both empirically and because
promise-keeping is a good of obviously only finite and relative weight,
certainly not always the right thing to do. And Razian epistemic authority
is neither about having rights to be followed nor a source of the reliably
continuous moral guidance that the old preemptive idea was supposed to
supply.24 We follow law not because we owe moral duties of “allegiance”
to lawgivers; we follow law because we owe moral duties to one another as
people living together in community. In that moral conversation, the one
we actually have now, authority and legitimacy serve no function beyond
synonymity with what is truly law and government. We do sometimes
encounter the word “illegitimacy” being thrown around loosely in political
discourse to condemn attempts at leadership that are argued to be morally
unjustified; the value in calling such attempts illegitimate, not just bad, lies
in raising doubt about whether the purported leader’s acts are truly law and
government.
Joseph Raz asserts that “since the law claims to have authority it is
capable of having it.”25 Echoing David Hume’s “because every one thinks
so,”26 Raz observes that our legal institutional rhetoric is replete with
authority claims and he rejects the possibility that those claims could be
“normally insincere or based on a conceptual mistake.”27 Yet we have
23

CLAUS, supra note 22.
Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 80 (1986) (describing “a piece-meal approach to
the question of the authority of governments”).
25
JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 210, 217 (1995).
26
HUME, supra note 19, at 547 (for reference in other editions of A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, this citation may be found in book III, part II, section VIII) (“[I]t being certain, that there is a
moral obligation to submit to government, because every one thinks so; it must be as certain, that this
obligation arises not from a promise, since no one, whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict
adherence to a system of philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that origin.”).
27
RAZ, supra note 25, at 217 (“[O]ne cannot sincerely claim that someone who is conceptually
incapable of having authority has authority if one understands the nature of one’s claim and of the
person of whom it is made. If I say that trees have authority over people, you will know that either my
grasp of the concepts of authority or of trees is deficient or that I am trying to deceive (or, of course,
that I am not really stating that trees have authority but merely pretending to do so, or that I am
play-acting, etc.). That is enough to show that since the law claims to have authority it is capable of
having it. Since the claim is made by legal officials wherever a legal system is in force, the possibility
24
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abundant historical evidence that they were and are. That rhetoric is a relic
of a formerly pervasive but fundamentally false conception, exemplified by
the dieu et mon droit motto that still adorns the British monarch’s coat of
arms. That rhetoric comes from a creationist vision of human life that we
have in other respects discarded. It is no argument against evolutionary
accounts of human life that we long went without them. The ubiquity of
the old rhetoric is explained by the former ubiquity of the old conception,
which is in turn explained by its easy assimilation within a creationist
world view and by the self-interest of powerful incumbents. Our language
has not caught up to our reasoning, and the defunct moral framework to
which it risks misdirecting us has the potential to send us in search of
something we do not always need—lawgiver intent—and to divert us from
directly seeking that which is indispensable to law’s success, namely,
shared understanding of a public meaning.
Fallback attempts to salvage an idea of authority as source of law may
frame it as a source of merely presumptive, defeasible duties to obey. Such
attempts might add value if they could demarcate a zone in which
lawgivers and law receivers can both know ex ante that lawgivers will be
morally justified in issuing laws and law receivers will be morally required
to follow laws. But there is no such zone. Each human action—of
lawgiving and of law following—is a separate, individualized moment of
all-things-considered moral judgment. From the lawgiver’s perspective,
doing particular acts that are likely to succeed in lawgiving may or may not
be the right thing to do whether or not the lawgiver came to power in a
good way. And for the rest of us, following law on particular occasions
may or may not be the right thing to do whether or not the lawgiver was
morally justified in doing the acts that made that law and whether or not
the lawgiver came to power in a good way. What’s the point of an
“authority” that is not coextensive with the claimant’s power, and not clear
ex ante about its own extent, and not in itself the answer to when we
should follow? Speaking of authority as the source of law also obfuscates
why we should follow, and where we should look for law’s meaning.
Asserting a content-independent prima facie duty to defer to authority
invokes a false correlativity to phantom lawgiver rights. The truth to which
defeasible duty talk points is simply that when we live inside legal
systems, we have a strong moral reason to maintain them, and that reason
that it is normally insincere or based on a conceptual mistake is ruled out. It may, of course, be
sometimes insincere or based on conceptual mistakes. But at the very least in the normal case the fact
that the law claims authority for itself shows that it is capable of having authority. Why cannot legal
officials and institutions be conceptually confused? One answer is that while they can be occasionally
they cannot be systematically confused. For given the centrality of legal institutions in our structures of
authority, their claims and conceptions are formed by and contribute to our concept of authority. It is
what it is in part as a result of the claims and conceptions of legal institutions.”).
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points us to following our law unless we have stronger moral reasons to do
differently. So why not just say that?
Sometimes we hear it said that the law claims authority. That may just
be shorthand for saying that lawgivers claim authority.28 On any occasion
that the saying involves a real retreat from lawgivers to the law itself, it is
in substance to retreat from talking about authority as source of law to
talking about authority as synonym for law. We might as well say that the
law claims to be law. Once we acknowledge the essentially customary,
conventional character of our legal systems, we can see that what makes
them work is not our incanting ancient fictions, but our attending to each
other. We have law “because every one thinks so,”29 and it is an
evolutionary account, not moral duties to lawgivers, that shows us how that
can be. Shared expectations shape action. The way that lets us live together
gives us moral reason to do as expected. What we have that moral reason
to follow is the law as our community understands it. Law is real only if it
succeeds in expressing to us our customs. Nothing can express to us our
customs unless it has a public meaning. When we look to words for law,
we are looking for their public meaning.30
The word normativity has at its heart an ambiguity perhaps designed to
bridge the gulf between moral skeptics and moral realists, an ambiguity
between what is normal and what is moral. We have moral reason to care
about what is normal for us in the sense of what is custom for us. That
reason is one of finite and relative weight; it never morally preempts our
consideration of reasons to do differently.
V. THE VALUE OF LAWGIVER INTENT
Public meaning is built into the concept of law. Without public
meaning, we are without law. When a legal system calls upon its dispute
resolvers to resolve real doubts about law’s meaning, the system is
effectively requiring those agents to create public meaning. In doing so,
dispute resolvers strive to treat the law in dispute as the product of a
rational mind—coherent, not self-contradictory—where that is possible,
because being such a product is necessary to fulfilling law’s function of
helping us live together, not because the lawgiver was in fact rational. If
the lawgiver was mentally checked out, with no actual understanding of
what he was signing up to, we would still try to treat his words as the
product of a rational mind. Understanding the actual workings of his mind
28

Id. at 215–20.
HUME, supra note 19, at 547 (for reference in other editions of A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE, this citation may be found in book III, part II, section VIII).
30
See also Laurence Claus, Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
953 (2014) (responding to commentaries from conference on LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (2012)).
29
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is not the primary reason we read his words—we read them not for what
they tell us about him, but for what they tell us about our practices, about
how our life together is going to be. Nonetheless, there may be
circumstances in which dispute resolvers will have morally weighty
reasons to defer to cogent evidence of lawgiver intent. One such reason
may be lawgiver expertise on the issue that the law addresses. Another
may be popular opinion about what the law should be, reflected in the
lawmaking process.
To isolate expertise as a reason for deference, imagine a scenario
where the initial lawgiver is an unelected regulation-writing official and
the dispute resolver is an elected court. Let us assume that the
administration in which the official operates is wholly unelected—that its
members are a self-selecting elite, like some boards of trustees, and are not
accountable to any elected officials other than the dispute-resolving court.
In this way, we can exclude the moral significance of popular will from the
analysis. When we do this, we can see that the moral significance of the
initial lawgiver’s intention derives only from whatever relative expertise
the initial lawgiver has about what legal content would be best. The moral
reason to give weight to evidence of lawgiver intention when resolving real
disputes about legal meaning would only be deference to expertise. If the
initial lawgiver had no greater expertise than the dispute-resolving court,
then there would be no reason for the court to care about his intention at
all, and the court could justifiably proceed to decide what law would be
best within the zone of genuine dispute, completely heedless of evidence
about the initial lawgiver’s intention. And, of course, even if the initial
lawgiver had morally significant expertise, that consideration would
remain a reason of finite and relative weight, susceptible to being
outweighed by other moral considerations.
Now let us move to a situation where the initial lawgiver was elected,
or was the public at large voting in a referendum or plebiscite. Now we
may see moral reasons for caring about lawgiver intention that are our
reasons for valuing democracy, particularly if the lawgiver was following
through on promises that recently got her elected or the public that spoke is
today’s public. Popular support may point to a particular meaning of law
because popular support figured in and helped morally justify the act of
attempting to make that law, even though popular support is neither always
sufficient, nor always necessary, to justify attempts to make law, and even
though what turns attempts to make law into law is whether We the People
follow it, not whether we favor it. If we do follow, the understanding we
show in our following constitutes law’s meaning. If we disagree among
ourselves about what law means, the fact its adoption had public support
might help resolve the dispute. Dispute resolvers may conclude that cogent
evidence of lawgiver intention should settle the doubt about what
democratic action accomplished. The challenge in such circumstances lies
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less in seeing value in lawgiver intention than in finding evidence of
intention that is genuinely cogent.
In asking whether we have cogent evidence of a group intent, we
cannot assume even that participants in a lawmaking act share an intent to
change the substance of the law.31 It is not perverse or irrational for
participants in a legislative process to intend to offset and effectively
neutralize each other’s initiatives, or to placate constituencies through
changes in law’s words that are not really intended to change what will
happen on the ground. If a new post-Arab Spring national constitution in
the Middle East both promises more about the applicability of Sharia law
and promises more about women’s rights, the net result might be a wash.
Maybe some delegates, maybe even many delegates, intended to maintain
the status quo; maybe not. Given the competing pressures to which
legislators are subject, there may well be acts of legislation for which the
actual intent of some or most or all of the legislators was to introduce a
mollifying linguistic substitute that is really just another way of saying
what the law always was. It would be quite wrong for an adjudicative body
to infer that the change in words was necessarily intended by the legislators
to produce a change in substance and that vagueness or ambiguity in the
words should be resolved accordingly in favor of substantive legal change.
VI. ORIGINAL MEANING VERSUS PRECEDENT
Finding law’s source in custom rather than authority clarifies not only
where we should look for law’s meaning, but also what counts as our
current law. If a court holds that a law means something different from that
law’s existing public meaning, what is our law now?32 Once we see that
the distinctively legal reason to care about law’s meaning is the value of
settled expectations, not of deference to authority, we can see that when a
revolutionary reading catches on—when we are beyond the tipping point
and the revolutionary reading has become the new expression of our
customs—then the legal reason to care about public meaning now supports
maintaining the precedent as the new existing public meaning. Arguing for
a return to original public meaning in such circumstances is like arguing
for a return to the Articles of Confederation because the Constitution’s
adoption did not conform to that existing law. An attempt to distinguish
might invoke Madison’s defense to claim that the Constitution’s adoption
was the will of the people33 and past court decisions are not. Yet as we
31

Cf. generally RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012).
For a thorough survey of the existing literature on the relation of originalist theory and
precedent, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, 33
CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT (2017)).
33
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have seen, the actual mechanism by which constitutions and court
decisions become our law is exactly the same, namely, through their
successful eliciting of shared expectations that they will hereafter express
what is custom for us. What stories we tell ourselves to get to new customs
varies, but once we have new expressions of custom, we have new law.
Revolutionary behavior may or may not be morally justified. Either
way, if it is successful, we are highly likely to tell ourselves that it was
justified, because it now supplies our law. Revolutionary behavior by
courts is unlikely to be forthright about its revolutionary character, but it is
not obvious that disingenuous claims of faithful interpretation are less
morally defensible than overt disregard, which would pose greater danger
of destabilizing the system. Judicial mini revolutions may release pressure
for legal change that could otherwise grow to threaten the legal system
much more profoundly. Of course if we think judicial precedents have
changed our law to be worse, we may seek to overturn them, but they will
still be our law in the meantime.
CONCLUSION: WHY WE READ
As Richard Kay observes, finding the meaning of rules cannot be
disconnected from the reason we “care about those rules in the first
place.”34 A quest to discover meaning is a quest for understanding. A quest
to understand a human communication is a quest to understand humans.
But which humans? For most of our messages, the answer is, quite
obviously, the authors. We read our love letters and work email and texts
from friends to understand the people who are writing to us. Is that why we
read law? It would be if lawgivers had a right to our obedience.
Understanding their will for our lives would then be our reason for caring
about their words. But that is not why we care about law. We care about
law because it lets us live together in large communities. We care about
law because it lets us live fuller and better lives than we could ever do
without it. We care about law because it lets us understand each other. Law
does this because it expresses the customs we share. Law does this because
its sayings self-fulfill. All this, law accomplishes if, and only if, it has a
public meaning that brings us together.

were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights,
that first principles might be resorted to.” 2 RECORDS, supra note 14, at 476 (Madison’s notes recording
proceedings of the Convention on August 31, 1787).
34
Kay, supra note 1, at 714.

